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In corporate spin-offs, spun-off units pursue two major objectives: separating and restructuring 
their business for independent operation; and retaining business continuity and minimizing 
operational disruptions. In trying to balance the conflicting demands of these objectives, spun-off 
units often turn to “transitional IT services” provided by their parents. However, the business 
value of the transitional IT services is not understood well yet. In this study, we examine different 
impacts of transitional IT services at different stages of corporate spin-offs. Our study population 
covers corporate spin-offs in which spun-off units were set up as independent public firms during 
1999-2009 timeframe. We find that longer transitional IT services prolong the time-to-close spin-
off deals and negatively affect market valuation of the spun-off units at the first day of trading. But 
longer transitional IT services positively affect operating performance of the spun-off units. They 
also help mitigate negative effects of business restructuring on operating performance. 
Keywords:  Spin-offs, transitional IT services, market valuation of IT, restructuring 
Organization Theory, Strategy, and IS 
2 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010  
Introduction 
"The lotus root may be severed, but its fibered threads are still connected"- Chinese proverb 
A corporate spin-off is a financial deal in which a business unit of a corporate parent is to be separated and set up as 
an independent firm (Bergh et al. 2008; Desai and Jain 1999). Between the date that the parent makes the pin-off 
decision and the date the deal legally closes, the spun-off unit has to make arrangements to become a standalone 
firm that operates and trades independently. This is a highly compressed timeframe. It leaves the spun-off unit only 
a few months to purposefully sever connections to parent’s shared services such as IT, marketing, accounting, and 
human resource services. However, as the Chinese prov rb in the opening suggests, the spun-off unit may not be 
able to cut all connections to its parent. Many fibered threads, such as shared IT applications and data, m y have to 
remain connected to the parent for an extended period of time until the spun-off unit figures out how to develop 
substitutes for them. This transition period can be characterized as a state of disequilibrium in which business 
strategies and resources of the unit are disrupted, but new strategies and resources have not yet emerg d or settled. 
Most of existing studies on business value of IT (e.g., Barua et al. 1995; Kohli and Devaraj 2003; Oh and 
Pinsonneault 2007) focus on investigating IT payoffs during relatively stable periods of business operations. The 
business value of IT during unstable periods is not understood yet. In addition, managing IT during unstable periods 
presents unique challenges different from those in stable periods. There is shortage of research on the role of IT 
during unstable periods of business operations suchas t e transition period in corporate spin-offs.  
In this study, we begin to address this gap by focusing on IT management dilemmas faced by spun-off units during 
spin-offs. We examine how they balance the conflicting demands of restructuring and transforming their business 
for independent operation while at the same time running the existing business operations without major disruptions. 
In this period, most spin-offs turn to “transitional IT services” from their parents. The advantage of transitional IT 
services is that they support existing business operations and give the new firm more time and flexibility in figuring 
out how to restructure its business and IT for independent operation. As for disadvantages, reliance o transitional 
services could prolong the time-to-close the deal and investors may not react favorably to a spun-off firm which 
keeps relying on its parent for support functions of its business. To generate new knowledge on busines  value of 
transitional IT services in corporate spin-offs, weexamine the role of such services at each stage of a spin-off and 
address the following four questions: (1) how does the duration of transitional IT services affect theime-to-close 
the spin-off deal? (2) how does the duration of transitional IT services affect the market valuation of the spun-off 
unit at the time of the deal close? (3) how does the duration  of transitional IT services affect the operational 
performance of the spun-off unit after the spin-off? and (4) how does the duration of transitional IT services affect 
the performance outcomes of business restructuring activities of the spun-off unit after the spin-off? 
Timeline of transitional IT services in corporate spin-offs  
Transitional services during a corporate spin-off are governed by transitional services agreements or TSAs. Figure 1 
illustrates the typical timeline of a spin-off and a TSA. When a parent announces its intention to separate and set up 
a business unit as an independent firm, the clock starts ticking. The parent and the unit usually have only a few 
months to close the deal and achieve legal separation. Practitioner research suggests that it takes an average of 115 
days to close large transactions over $1 billion (Deloitte 2008b). Since it is usually not feasible to separate IT or 
build new IT services in such a short period of time, the two parties plan and develop a TSA so that the parent can 
continue providing IT services to the spun-off entity as if the parent were an outsourcing vendor. But unlike an 
outsourcing vendor, the parent has no interest in providing IT services to the spun-off unit. It usually seeks to get off 
the TSA as soon as possible and focus on serving its own businesses. Even if the parent has the best of intentions to 
serve the spun-off unit, it may lack no expertise and capabilities to serve a separate firm. Lastly, a TSA is a time-
bounded contract. Neither party has expectation for repeat business. By the time the transition period is over and 
TSA is terminated, the spun-off firm needs to set up its own IT services. Similarly, if the spun-off unit cannot easily 
separate non-IT functions such as finance, accounting, and human resource management, it can develop sparate 
TSAs to receive those services from the parent.  
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Note: Business unit #3(BU3) is spun off from Corporation #1 to create Corporation #2. 
          TSA: Transition Service Agreement 
Source: adapted from (Deloitte 2008b) 
Figure 1. An Illustrative Timeline of a Spin-off and a TSA 
 
Hypotheses Development 
Research question-1: how does the duration of transitional IT services affect the time-to-close the spin-
off deal? 
In figure 1, during the transaction period between the announcement of a spin-off deal and the deal close, the parent 
firm and the unit to be spun-off (BU3) need to negotiate the main separation agreement and its ancillary contracts 
including TSAs; prepare pro forma financial statements for the unit; apply for regulatory approval; and disentangle 
the unit (Gole and Hilger 2008). The transaction timel ne is driven mainly by mutual agreements on the deal 
structure and the approval of the contracts. There is usually not enough time during the transaction period to plan for 
IT implementation issues, let along the acquisition of the IT resources needed for self support (Deloitt  2008a). 
Thus, a TSA becomes necessary to allow the spun-off unit to use the parent firm’s IT resources in a transition period 
after the spin-off when it is architecting its own IT platform. A challenge is to decide on the duration of IT services. 
It is in the interest of the parent to minimize this duration. The spun-off unit may need a longer period to gain time 
to build its own IT platform. However, longer transitional IT services could prolong the time-to-close th  deal for 
two reasons. 
First, continuing IT interdependence between the par nt and the spun-off unit after a spin-off will raise IT security 
and regulatory compliance concerns for both parties. Because the parent and the spun-off firm will become 
independent legal entities, continuing to share comm n IT networks and applications increases the risks of 
unauthorized access to each other’s sensitive information. The parent firm will have to create logical ompartments 
to isolate the two firms in the same physical IT platform (Gartner 2005; Leimeister et al. 2008). Such logical 
separation has to be achieved by the deal close date. Longer transitional IT services imply higher level of IT 
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resource sharing between the two parties, more effort to plan the separation, and hence, longer time to close the deal. 
In addition, after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), fiduciary responsibilities are scrutinized closely. 
Unlike an outsourcing service provider, the parent firm may not have the capabilities to serve another company with 
a SOX compliant environment, which increases the prepa ation workload of both parties and further prolong the 
time-to-close the deal. 
Second, designing governance mechanisms over the post-s in-off relationship of the two parties is an arduous task. 
Unlike outsourcing services, transitional services are negotiated in a parent-subsidiary context rathe than a market 
exchange context. Without interest in serving a separate firm and expectation of repeat business, the par nt firm 
usually considers the provision of transitional IT services to be a nuisance and a distraction (Deloitt  2008b). Thus, 
the spun-off unit needs much more negotiation, coordination, and lobbying efforts to get longer transitional IT 
services. In addition, longer transitional IT services imply that prior to the spin-off the reliance of the spun-off firm 
on its parent’s IT platform is high. Dismantling tight IT integration and migrating into a new IT platform are 
complex and risky IT projects, which need close cooperation between the spun-off unit and the parent after the spin-
off. Governing relationships with high asset specificity, high task uncertainty, and high task complexity entails more 
extensive planning (Chen and Bharadwaj 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002). Moreover, because transitional IT services 
are time-bounded, the parent firm is likely to behave opportunistically after the spin-off so there is need for more 
planning time to develop more explicit contract-based governance mechanisms (Reuer and Arino 2007). Anderson 
and Dekker (2005) show that more extensive contracts need more time to prepare and get mutual agreement. Last, 
designing governance mechanisms over transitional services entails the involvement of more external expertise. For 
example, the design of contractual clauses needs to involve contract design capabilities among appropriate groups of 
personnel (Argyres and Mayer 2007), but in a spin-off case, because a spin-off is a rare event, firms usually lack in-
house expertise for designing intensive IT services and associated governance mechanisms. They may have to hire 
external consultants who have sufficient spin-off experience. The extra expertise requirements can also lengthen the 
time to close the deal. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1: Longer transitional IT services prolong the time-to-close corporate spin-off deals. 
Research question-2: how does the duration of transitional IT services affect market valuation of the 
spun-off unit at the time of the deal close?   
The spun-off firm will start trading as an independt firm at the deal close date and be valued by capital markets. 
Market valuation of a spun-off unit is one of the most frequently studied questions in the spin-off literature (e.g., 
Burch and Nanda 2003; Desai and Jain 1999; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999). According to this literature, 
capital markets do not have access to as much information about units of a firm as the corporate parent of the units. 
This information asymmetry between the parent and markets could lead to undervaluation of the parent’s units 
(Bergh et al. 2008; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999). If the parent feels that a business unit is undervalued 
because the capital markets do not realize its true g owth potential, it will choose to spin it off as separate entity. 
Since the spun-off unit will release more information to capital markets and reduce the information asymmetry, its 
valuation is expected to go up (Bergh et al. 2008). 
However, if the spun-off unit does not rapidly become operationally independent and continues to use transi ional IT 
services from the parent, the spin-off transaction will preserve some of the information asymmetry rather than 
reduce it. A long transition IT service will signal to capital markets that the spun-off firm has not tackled the 
separation challenge yet and just postpones it. There is not sufficient information about the capability of the new 
firm to survive and grow independently. In addition, the presence of transitional IT services will signal that future 
business operations of the firm remain uncertain since the supporting functions are not ready yet. For example, when 
Discover was spun off from Morgan Stanley in 2007, Morgan Stanley agreed to continue supporting Discover’s IT, 
accounting, HR, and other corporate functions for 18 months. In its prospectus, Discover disclosed the risks and 
uncertainties created by the delays of its operation l independence as follows: “Our ability to operate our business 
effectively may suffer if we do not, quickly and cost effectively, establish our own financial, administrative and other 
support functions to operate as a stand-alone company...after these agreements [TSAs] with Morgan Stanley expire 
or are terminated, we may not be able to replace these services at all or obtain these services at acceptable prices 
and terms” (Discover Financial Services 2007). When information asymmetry continues, investors may underprice 
the spun-off firm as a result of adverse selection (Michaely and Shaw 1994).   
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Capital markets incorporate IT of a firm into the firm’s market valuation (Dehning et al. 2003; Dos Santos et al. 
1993; Im et al. 2001). In the context of spin-offs, IT is crucial for the spun-off firm to both retain business continuity 
and enable strategic renewal. Thus, we expect that capi al markets take into account a spun-off firm’s IT in valuating 
it. However, the firm’s reliance on transitional ITservices signals to the market that the spun-off firm has not yet 
been able to operate independently since it has not become IT self-sufficient. The uncertainty about the spun-off 
firm’s future IT and business operations will likely reduce the valuation of the firm. Thus:  
H2: Longer transitional IT services negatively affect market valuation of spun-off firms at the first day of trading  
Research question-3: How does the duration of transitional IT service affect the operating 
performance of the spun-off unit? 
During the transition period, a spun-off firm needs to build its new IT platform. Compared with IT projects 
undertaken during periods of relative stability, IT projects during the spin-off context face three uniq e challenges. 
First, they are confronted with conflicting goals of short-term operational stability and long-term strategic renewal 
and flexibility. The spun-off firm needs to minimize spin-off disruptions and stabilize its business operations to 
survive and continue its operations. At the same ti, it needs to restructure itself for future growth and profitability. 
However, long-term strategies of the unit have not necessarily emerged yet. So, strategic flexibility of the new IT 
platform is vital in case the firm needs to change its strategic direction. Second, IT projects in spin-offs are usually 
conducted under extreme time pressures. While the IT platform of an established firm develops over many years, the 
spun-off unit is expected to develop an equivalent o e within a few months. Finally, spun-off firms are also 
constrained by tight budgets, not just for IT but for all other functions. An illustrative case in point s Dephi’s spin-
off of its automotive interior business, Inteva. The CIO of Inteva, who was appointed only six months before the 
spin-off, states: “My task was to determine where we wanted to go ‘after we grew up’. One thing was certain: We 
were going to be a much smaller organization than we had been before the spin-off. Yet despite our size, we still 
faced the challenges of a global organization… To complicate matters, the Transition Service Agreement that was 
being negotiated gave Inteva just twelve months to migrate the entire infrastructure and application evironment 
away from the former parent…In addition, I was challenged by our CEO to reduce IT costs dramatically (dropping 
from two percent of revenue to less than one percent)”(Hodges 2008). We propose that transitional IT servic s can 
address these challenges and improve performance throug  two mechanisms: providing option value and reducing 
time compression diseconomies. 
Transitional IT services can provide option value by deferring the capital investments that a brand new IT platform 
requires until after the spin-off. Because both the strategy and the operational model of a spun-off firm are likely to 
be reshaped after its independence, it is hard to foresee all the IT requirements and make ex ante IT investments. 
Thus, transitional IT services provide the firm with the “value of waiting to invest”(McDonald and Siegel 1986). 
When environment is uncertain, and investment is irreversible, the option to hold investment until thearrival of new 
information for decision marking becomes valuable (Majd and Pindyck 1987). IT investments are usually 
considered irreversible because IT development and implementation expenditures cannot be easily retrieved when 
the environment changes (Taudes et al. 2000). To create the option to adapt, a firm can choose to invest in a general-
purpose IT platform upon which a family of applicatons can be deployed later (Fichman 2004; Taudes et al. 2000).  
However, such IT platform usually demands intensive capital investment and long implementation time, which are 
usually absent during a spin-off period. Using transition IT services provides an alternative approach to “purchase” 
the option of deferring investment. For example, in Inteva’s case above, the CIO probably cannot make any 
substantial IT commitments before the spin-off because the desired end states of Inteva’s business and IT are 
indeterminate yet. During the 12 month transitional service period, the CIO and other business executives can make 
sense of the new environment, properly reposition the firm, and optimize the firm’s resource reconfiguration. IT 
investments can then be made after business needs bcome stable. In addition, a spun-off firm usually faces resource 
constraints. Postponed IT investments can release the scarce capital, human resource, and management att tion for 
other urgent tasks during the transition period.  
Transitional IT services also reduce the time compression diseconomies inherent in IT development. Thetim  
compression diseconomy refers to the fact that time is a nonsubstitutable factor in obtaining or building certain 
resources (Dierickx and Cool 1989). Building IT resources is subject to strong time compression diseconomies 
(Bharadwaj 2000). For example, if an ERP application akes 10 consultants and two years to implement, doubling 
the number of consultants to 20 will not necessarily reduce the implementation time to one year with the same 
implementation quality. During a spin-off, the spun-off firm faces great time pressure to reverse years of IT 
Organization Theory, Strategy, and IS 
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integration with its parent firm. Transitional IT services can relieve this time pressure and provide more time to the 
spun-off firm to build new IT platform that meets iemerging strategic and operational needs and subseq ently 
improve its operating performance. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H3: Longer transitional IT services are positively associated with operating performance of spun-off firms 
Research question-4: how does the duration of transitional IT services affect the performance 
outcomes of business restructuring activities of the spun-off unit after the spin-off? 
Under the governance of a parent firm, a business unit is subject to many constraints of a large firm. For example, 
individual units may bear high administrative costs as a part of a large parent especially when busines  environments 
are uncertain and the parent is highly diversified (Bergh and Lawless 1998). The corporate-wide compensation 
system may not adequately incentivize divisional managers (Seward and Walsh 1996; Woo et al. 1992). The spin-
off event thus gives the unit an opportunity to break free from the constraints of the parent, renew its strategies, and 
realign itself with its competitive environment. On the other hand, the spun-off unit will inherit culture, routines, 
norms, and structures from its parent. These elements were institutionalized in a large and stable firm and will create 
inertia for renewal and restructuring of a relatively smaller and younger spun-off firm. From either prspective, the 
spun-off firm needs to restructure itself to release it  growth potential as an independent entity. To capture the extent 
of restructuring undertaken by the spun-off unit, we use the business restructuring intensity construct and define it 
as the extent to which a firm changes its organization l structure, industrial positioning, business processes, scale, 
workforce, geographic presence, and other organizational parameters. 
Organizational restructuring increases the risk of disruption in business operations. Established and stable 
organizations are characterized by the reliability that they can repeatedly deliver their products or ervices on time 
and with promised quality, and the accountability that they have formulated rational and internally consistent rules 
and procedures for their actions (Hannan and Freeman 1984). During the restructuring period, however, a spun-off 
firm may lack these two attributes. Because new busines  rules and procedures are not set up or institutionalized, 
spun-off firms may produce products and services with greater variance of quality. They are also likely to make 
inconsistent decisions due to lack of guiding principles and clear strategic objectives. In addition, during the 
restructuring period, more resources have to be alloc ted to non-recurring activities rather than normal business 
operations. The outputs of business operations, reflect d in operating performance, will likely be reduced.  
Empirical studies on organizational change found that restructuring would ultimately improve performance due to a 
better fit with environment (Haveman 1992; Kelly and Amburgey 1991), but relatively less attention hasbeen paid 
to the performance during the restructuring period. One exception is the study by McKendrick and his colleague 
(2009), who found that, in the period directly after he spin-off, the parent firm will experience disruption in its 
innovation rate, although it will ultimately recover from it. In the post-acquisition context, Barkema and Schijven 
(2008) found a similar pattern that acquiring firms do not necessarily benefit from their acquisitions immediately, 
and synergic value of acquisitions can be unleashed only after a restructuring period. Similarly, a spun-off firm may 
experience temporal performance deterioration during the restructuring period. Further, from a human resource 
perspective, restructuring during the spin-off often implies downsizing of the workforce to fit the shrunk business 
scale. Employees experiencing downsizing will worry about their job security and become less productive, narrow-
minded, and self-absorbed (Cascio 1993). In the accounting literature, restructuring has also been found to weaken 
firms’ internal control systems and thus expose them to higher risks of undesirable employee behaviors and distorted 
business processes. (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007). Thus, we hypothesize: 
H4: Business restructuring intensity is negatively associated with operational performance of spun-off firms 
Utilizing transitional IT services from the parent can mitigate the potential negative effects of busine s restructuring 
and accelerate the realization of its benefits. First, t ansitional IT services can enable higher restructuring flexibility. 
Although a spin-off event offers a window of opportuni y to renew the spun-off firm’s legacy systems and the 
institutionalized routines (Tyre and Orlikowski 1994), the spun-off firm may not have the flexibility to do so due to 
the pressure of business continuity and resource constraints. Survival is always the top priority for any newly 
established firm, so a new firm tends to avoid long horizon investments and pursue short-term benefits (Souder and 
Shaver forthcoming). Transitional IT services relieve a spun-off firm’s concerns about business continuity and allow 
it to experiment with its restructuring options with greater flexibility. One illustrative case is Birds Eye, a frozen 
food company which was spun off from Unilever in 2006. The CIO of Birds Eye states: “We have been dependent 
on Unilever for back office and systems and that has affected the ways we do things. Now we are a mediu -s zed 
 Du & Tanriverdi / transitional IT services in corporate spin-offs 
  
 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010 7 
business and to grow it will mean a very different vironment…it was very exciting to build [the IT platform] from 
scratch, to build my own destiny with no horrible legacy that we all spend our careers having to work with”. A 
twelve-month-long IT services commitment from Unilever provides Birds Eye the time and flexibility it needed to 
restructure its business and IT operations (Chillingworth 2009). 
In addition, a well-functioning IT infrastructure can ensure the minimum requirement for effective business 
restructuring. Business restructuring demands intensiv  communication and coordination work, so a fundamental 
communication platform must be readily available. In the business process redesign context, Broadbent, Weill, and 
Clair (1999) find that a basic level of IT infrastructure capability is needed for all firms to redesign their business 
processes. Examples of necessary infrastructure include firm-wide communication network, emails, data storage and 
transmission, security, and other basic IT functions. Then, because organizational structure and business routines are 
usually embedded in IT applications, organizational changes become technology-mediated such that changes i  
business design have to be configured into IT applications before it can take into effects (Volkoff et al. 2007).  
Higher level quality of IT infrastructure can help firms implement extensive changes over relatively short time 
frames (Broadbent et al. 1999). A spun-off firm may h ve to rely on transitional IT services from its parent for such 
IT infrastructure needs. In addition, data analytics can be crucial for the spun-off firm to make informed decisions 
during restructuring. However, it usually takes a long time for a spun-off firm to migrate its historical data to its own 
IT environment. A transitional IT service from the parent can allow the spun-off firm to have real time access to data 
and analytical tools to support decision making. So, we hypothesize: 
H5: Longer transitional IT services mitigate the negative impacts of business restructuring intensity on operational 
performance of spun-off firms 
Method 
Sample and Data 
Our study population includes all spin-offs announced between 1999 and 2009 and tracked by the SDC Platinum, a 
financial transaction database maintained by Thomson Reuters. We selected our sample based on the following 
criteria: (1) the spin-off deal is closed; (2) the spun-off firm is operating in the United States; (3) the spun-off firm is 
publicly traded; (4) the spin-off represents a 100% stock distribution. The forth criterion ensures that the parent and 
the spun-off firm become completely independent after the deal close. These criteria produce an initial sample of 
152 spin-offs. None of the parents are private equity firms. 
For each spun-off firm in the sample, we retrieved its security registration filings (usually form 10-2B, 8-A12B, or 
S-1) and material events announcement filings (form 8-K) around the spin-off period from SEC’s Edgar dtabase. 
Those filings were skimmed to identify possible transitional arrangements between the spun-off firm and its parent. 
Spun-off firms usually disclose their TSAs1 or describe the contents of TSAs in the exhibits to the aforementioned 
filings. These disclosures were then excerpted and rea . 125 of the 152 spun-off firms in our sample have mentioned 
the adoption of TSAs, and among them 113 firms disclose major parts of their TSAs. Because public companies are 
mandated to disclose contracts which are material enough to influence investor decisions (Regulation S-K 17 CFR), 
the absence of a TSA in regulatory filings implies that the TSA was either not used or not material enough to be 
disclosed.  
We matched our sample with CompuStat and CRSP databases to obtain the financial data required for computation 
of our dependent variables. 128 spun-off firms and 120 parent firms are covered in CompuStat while 138 spun-off 
firms are covered in CRSP. Due to missing values in individual data items used in computations of different 
variables, our sample size drops further in various research models as shown in Table 2. 
                                                      
1 In most cases, these contracts are directly titled “transition service agreement” or “transitional service agreement”. 
Occasionally, they are titled “interim service agreement”, “service agreement”, or “corporate service agreement”. We rely on the 
description of these contracts in the spun-off firms’ filings to conclude if they are transitional services agreements.  
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Dependent Variables 
Time-to-close the deal 
We computed the time-to-close the deal as the duration of the period between the announcement date of a spin-off 
deal and its close date. Both dates were collected from the SDC Platinum database. We trimmed the raw d ta at the 
5th and 95th percentiles to exclude extreme observations (Barber and Lyon 1996). As a result, four extr me 
observations were excluded in the estimation models, which include spin-off deals taking less than 23 days or longer 
than 630 days to close.  
Market Valuation  
We used Tobin’s Q to capture the market valuation of the spun-off firm at its first trading date. Tobin’s Q is a 
market-based, forward-looking measure which reflects apital markets’ perception of a firm’s future growth 
potential. Because a spun-off firm files its security egistration forms and discloses spin-off information to SEC 
before its stocks are approved to be publicly traded, if transition services provided by the parent firm have any 
impacts on the spun-off firm, it should be reflected in the spun-off firm’s valuation on the first trading date of its 
stock.  
Tobin’s Q contrasts market value of a firm with the replacement cost of its assets. This measure has been used in 
previous studies to detect IT effects on firm performance (e.g., Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Tanriverdi 2006). It is 
computed based on the following formula (Bharadwaj et al. 1999): 
                              ' ( ) /Tobin s Q MV PS DEBT TA = + +  
Where MV = [the closing price of the company's stock at its first trading date (CRSP item: PRC)] x [the total 
number of outstanding shares (CRSP item: SHOUT) at the same day];  
            PS = [the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock (Compustat item: PSTKL)];  
             DEBT = [Current liability (Compustat item: LCT) – Current assets (Compustat item: ACT) + Book value of 
inventories (Compustat item: INVT) + Long term debt (Compustat item: DLTT)]; 
            TA = [Book value of total assets (Compustat item: AT)]. 
Operating Performance 
We use the improvement (or deterioration) of a spun-off firm’s return on assets (ROA) as a measure of its operating 
performance. ROA is computed as the operational earning of the company (CompuStat item: EBITDA) divided by 
its total asset (CompuStat item: AT). ROA improvement is then computed as difference between ROA in two years 
after the spinoff in comparison with the ROA in the year before the spin-off. This two years window is selected to 
observe the business restructuring intensity of the spun-off firm after the spin-off. For each spun-off company, its 
fiscal year end date is compared with the spin-off deal close date to ensure that we select the correct fiscal year 
before the spin-off for computation. ROA has been widely used as a performance measure in similar resea ch 
context (e.g.,Bergh 1995; Hoskisson et al. 1994).  
Independent Variable 
Duration of transitional IT Service  
In the aforementioned process, we collected spun-off firms’ SEC filings about their TSAs with their parent firms. 
For each spin-off, we examined the existence of the following six types of functional services contracted in a TSA: 
IT services, financial services, human resource servic s, legal services, marketing services, and supply chain 
services. The duration of each type of transitional service was also collected when it exists. We dropped 11 
observations for which there is evidence about the existence of TSAs but not enough information about the types of 
services provided or their durations. The data is measured in months. 
Thus, duration of transitional IT service is measured as the length of the period in which the parent firm committed 
to provide IT services to the spun-off firm and considered zero if IT services are not contracted in a TSA. Our data 
show that IT services are the most frequently provided transitional services from the parent firm to the spun-off firm. 
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The average duration of IT services is also the longest. About 65% of our spin-off sample has utilized transitional IT 
services. The average duration of transitional IT services is 11.69 months (SD=14.15).  
Business restructuring intensity  
We measured business restructuring intensity as the portion of the spun-off firm’s revenue allocated to restructuring 
activities within two years after the spin-off. Specifically, it is measured as the ratio of restructuring cost 
(CompuStat item: RCP) to the sales (CompuStat item: SALE) of the spun-off firm within the two years period after 
the spinoff. As explained by CompuStat manual, the i em RCP means “Restructuring Costs Pretax” and covers 
“closing costs, exit costs, reductions in workforce, ationalizations, realignment, relocation charges, repositioning, 
early retirement, and Chapter 11 reorganization costs/Chapter 11 expenses.” This item is widely used in the 
accounting literature to measure a firm’s restructuring costs (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; 
Ogneva et al. 2007).  
Control Variables 
Duration of non-IT transitional services 
In addition to transitional IT services, we controlled for the duration of five other functional services as contracted in 
TSAs, including financial services (e.g., accounting, tax, auditing, treasury, and corporate finance functions), human 
resource services, legal services, marketing services, and supply chain services (e.g, procurement, inventory 
management, distribution, transportation, and other logistics functions). These five variables are also measured in 
months. 
Characteristics of the Transaction 
Transaction volume. We controlled for the relative transaction volume because large deals tend to involve longer 
transition services, spin off more attractive busine ses, but also take longer time to close. Transaction volume is 
measured as the percentage of revenue divested (Hitt et al. 1996), which is computed as the revenue of the spun-off 
firm divided by the revenue of the parent firm in the most recent fiscal year before the spin-off.  
Relatedness. The relatedness between the parent and the spun-off firms’ businesses is a widely studied factor that 
shapes both divestiture processes and outcomes (e.g., B r h 1995; Desai and Jain 1999; Woo et al. 1992). Following 
(Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999), we measured relatedness as a dummy variable which takes 1 if the primary 
business of the parent firm and the spun-off firm operating in the same industry based on two digit SIC code.  
Reciprocity. Instead of unidirectional transitional services provided by the parent firm to the spun-off firm, the 
transitional services are reciprocal in 37.2% of our bservations, although the services from the spun-off firm to its 
former parent are usually much less significant in their scale and scope. Providing services back to the parent firm 
will increase the bargaining power of the spun-off firm, and thus potentially influence our dependent variables. 
Thus, we controlled for the reciprocity of the transitional services. Reciprocity is measured as a dummy variable 
which takes 1 if the parent company and the spun-off company provide transitional services to each other.   
SOX exposure. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) dramatically increased the role of IT controls in regulatory 
environment of public companies listed in the United States. Divestitures could disrupt the internal IT control 
environment of the divesting firm and causes its incompliance with SOX (Tanriverdi and Du 2009). With the 
pressure of SOX compliance, both the parent and the spun-off firms will be more cautious in negotiating transitional 
IT services. Thus, we controlled for SOX exposure of the spin-off deal. SOX exposure is measured as a dummy 
variable which takes 1 if the spin-off deal is closed in or after the year 2004, the earliest SOX compliance deadline. 
Regulated Industry. Industry-specific regulation plays a major role in determining the structure of a spin-off deal 
and the time needed to close a deal. We thus controlled whether the spun-off firm is operating in highly regulated 
industries, measured as a dummy variable which takes 1 if the NAICS sector code of the spun-off company equals 
22 (utility), 48 or 49 (transportation), or 52 (fina ce). 
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Characteristics of the spun-off firm 
Size. The size of the firm before the spin-off may determine its market valuation, its future performance, and the 
transitional arrangements. So we controlled for the siz  of the spun-off firm before the spin-off. The size of the 
spun-off firm is measured as the logarithm of its total assets (CompuStat item: AT) at the end of the most recent 
fiscal year before the spinoff. Although a spun-off firm starts to be publicly traded only after the spin-off, it is 
mandated to disclose its historical financial data for the past three years, which is also recorded by CompuStat. So, 
financial data about spun-off firms before the spin-off are generally available.  
Profitability . Similarly, the profitability of the firm before the spin-off may influence its market valuation, its future 
performance as well as the transitional arrangements. So we controlled for the profitability of the spun-off firm 
before the spin-off. The profitability of the spun-off firm is measured as its ROA, as previously defin d, at the most 
recent fiscal year before the spin-off.  
Characteristics of the parent firm 
Size. Large companies tend to have more abundant resources and well established routines to contract and provide 
transitional services to their spun-off units. Business units spun off from large companies may have more coverage 
from both public media and equity analysts, which possibly influence their valuation. So we controlled for the size 
of the parent firm, measured as the logarithm of the total assets of the parent firm (CompuStat item: AT) at the end 
of the most recent fiscal year before the spin-off.  
Economic cycle and industry controls 
Economic cycle. Capital markets demonstrate periodic patterns with economic cycles. Since our sample covers a 
relatively long period from 1999 to 2009, the valuation of the spun-off firm may be influenced by the stock market 
condition when the spin-off happens. We controlled whether a spin-off happens in a stock market booming year by a 
dummy variable. This variable takes 1 when the S&P 500 index in the observation year is above the average of the 
period 1999-2009, and 0 otherwise. 
Industry . Capital market valuation varies as a function of industry value. Thus, we controlled for the industrial 
effect by using the average Tobin’s Q of an industry. Industry is defined based on the 2 digit NAICS sector code. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients among our st dy variables.  
Model Specification 
Our dependent variables span different stages during the timeline of a spin-off deal. This implies that the variables in 
earlier stages of the timeline could become endogenus variables in models examining later stages of the timeline. 
For example, the time-to-close the deal becomes endogenous to the market valuation model which in turn becomes 
endogenous to the operating performance model. Therefor , instead of estimating separate regressions fr our 
hypotheses, we estimated simultaneous equation models using three-stage least squares method (3SLS) (Greene 
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We controlled for non-IT transitional services in all three equations. We controlled all characteristics of the parent, 
the spun-off firm, and the deal in the time-to-close the deal equation. For market valuation, we further controlled for 
industrial effect and economic cycle but not the industrial regulation status. Last, for operating performance we 
controlled the initial condition of the spun-off firm such as its size and profitability, considering that other pre-spin-
off factors had been accounted for by including market valuation in estimating operating performance. The detailed 
list of control variables for each equation is presented in Table 2. 
Results and Discussions 
The model estimation results are presented in Table 2. The estimation results of each equation are present d in one 
column. Brief results are also graphically presented in Figure 2 for interpretation convenience. Some of our control 
variables have relatively high correlations. Thus, we check variance inflation factors (VIFs) to asses potential 
presence of multicollinearity. The highest VIF score in our models is 6.31, which is below the suggested threshold 
of 10. Thus, we do not find evidence of severe multicol inearity problems.  
In Table 2, the relationship between the duration of transitional IT services and the time-to-close th deal is 
significant and positive, indicating that planning to provide longer transitional IT services is associated with longer 
time between the announcement of the spin-off and its close. Thus, H1 is supported. This finding confirms the 
anecdotal evidence that IT is often neglected in planning a corporate transaction. Because the provision of 
transitional IT services will postpone the IT independence of the spun-off firm, if IT independence is a erious 
concern at the deal planning phase, then the adoption of transitional IT services should shorten the deal close time. 
Organization Theory, Strategy, and IS 
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Otherwise the timeline will be mainly driven by deal negotiation and preparation, in which providing transitional IT 
services complicates the transaction structure and incur more contracting and preparation costs. Both anecdotal 
evidence and our empirical results support the lattr rationale.  
The effect of transitional IT service duration on market valuation is negative and significant, which suggests that the 
reliance on the parent firm for IT services is considered to be a negative signal by capital markets. Thus, H2 is 
supported.  
The results show that longer transitional IT services positively and significantly affect operating performance (H3). 
Thus, H3 is supported. However, the main effect of business restructuring intensity on operating performance (H4) 
is negative but not significant, indicating that we do not have statistical evidence in support of H4.The joint 
performance effect of transitional IT service duration and business restructuring intensity is positive and significant 
(H5). Thus, the results indicate that longer transitional IT services not only directly improve the spun-off firm’s 
performance, but also mitigate the potential negative impacts of business restructuring activities.   
 
 
        
 
 
Figure 2. Models Estimation Results 
 Du & Tanriverdi / transitional IT services in corporate spin-offs 
  
 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010 13 
 
Organization Theory, Strategy, and IS 
14 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010  
Conclusions 
Corporate spin-offs provide an interesting context in which researchers can observe how an existing business unit 
purposefully disposes of its existing IT services and builds brand new IT services as it tries to restructure itself as an 
independent firm, but at the same time, minimize disruptions to its established business. Receiving transitional IT 
services from the parent is a key mechanism for balancing these conflicting objectives. Our findings show that 
transitional IT services are critical for minimizing the negative effects of business restructuring on operational 
performance, and improving operational performance of the spun-off unit. But we also find that longer transitional 
IT services increase the time-to-close the spin-off deal and reduce market valuation of the spun-off unit. Thus, as a 
consulting firm put well, “TSAs should be viewed as ‘necessary evils’ and used for only the most critical activities” 
(Deloitte 2006). 
Our study contributes to IS research by examining business value of transitional IT services in corporate spin-offs. 
Most business value of IT research has been conducte  under the assumption of equilibrium when busines 
operations of firms are assumed to be relatively stable. In corporate spin-offs, this assumption is not valid. The 
transaction disrupts the status quo for the spun-off unit dramatically. The unit loses its access to IT services of the 
parent. It has to create new IT services to be able to operate as an independent firm. Transitional IT services is one 
mechanism to manage through this disequilibrium phase until the spun-off firm builds its new IT platform and a new 
equilibrium emerges. This study makes a contribution by uncovering business value of transitional IT services in 
that period.  
Our findings also have implications for finance and strategic management literatures on valuation and performance 
of corporate spin-offs. Although practitioners claim that “operations are the heart of divestiture value”(Kumar and 
Borgman 2009), finance and strategic management resea ch focus exclusively on macro level determinants of 
spinoff value and performance. They pay very little attention to the separation process (Brauer 2006). The omission 
of the transition and separation processes could partially explain why existing findings on valuation and 
performance of corporate spinoffs are mixed and confli ti g (Veld and Veld-Merkoulova 2009). By showing that 
the length of transitional IT services significantly impacts both the valuation and operating performance of spun-off 
units, this study shows that there is potential to advance the current states of finance and strategic management 
literatures on corporate spin-offs by introducing IT constructs into research models. 
There are several potential directions to extend our study. First, although both TSAs and outsourcing contracts are 
service agreements, TSAs have many unique characteristics. Unlike outsourcing relationships, parties of TSAs need 
to finally cut inter-organizational routines and interfaces rather than build them. In addition, service providers of 
TSAs have more bargaining power and are less incentivized to provide services, which are both opposite to the 
situations in an outsourcing context. These differences should have influences on contract design. A study on 
contracting transitional services may reveal different insights from regular outsourcing contract studies which are 
prevalent in recent years. Second, the length of transitional services is shown to have both potential dr wbacks and 
benefits in this study. There could be multiple contingencies influencing the tradeoff. Further studies can be 
positioned to provide decision guidance on selecting optimal service duration. Third, our study is subject to the 
limitations of archival data. Future studies using either qualitative or survey research methods may reveal further 
insights about IT transition processes. 
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